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The Rough Face of China’s Soft Power

  • sabiineb
  • Sep 2, 2019
  • 2 min read

Updated: Oct 16, 2024

Inese Liepiņa, Sabīne Bērziņa (Re:Baltica), Holger Roonemaa, Mari Eesmaa (Postimees), Naglis Navakas (Verslo Žinios)


The objectives of China’s soft power in the Baltic states are to prevent the rise of uncomfortable foreign policy issues like autonomy for Tibet and to disseminate Beijing’s worldview through Confucius Institutes.

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This May, parliamentarians from all over the world gathered in Latvia’s capital Riga to meet with representatives of Tibet’s exile government and parliament. Yoko Alender, the head of Estonia’s parliament’s support group for Tibet, was debating whether to participate. Only two other people knew about her plans, and she had not yet asked the parliament to arrange the visit.


One day Enn Eesmaa, the head of the parliament’s foreign affairs committee, pulled her aside. “He asked me if I had already been to Riga and if I’m the only one. At first, I didn’t understand at all what he was talking about,” Alender says. It turned out that the Chinese ambassador to Estonia had brought the subject up with Eesmaa.


Alender said she felt very uneasy and didn’t understand how the Chinese could have possibly known about her plans. Ultimately, she didn’t attend the convention, citing a busy schedule ahead of European Parliament elections. In the end, no active Estonian politicians attended.


“That is definitely China’s soft power at work,” Youdon Aukatsang, a member of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, told Re:Baltica/Postimees.


China’s “One China, two systems” policy doesn’t support the existence of either sovereign Tibet or Taiwan. As a result, China doesn’t shy away from using diplomacy to hinder Baltic contacts with the Dalai Lama or meetings with Taiwan’s officials.


Under Pressure


On at least four occasions over the past two years, China’s embassy in Estonia has protested against Estonia’s politicians meeting the Dalai Lama, representatives of Tibet’s exile government or Taiwanese officials. Just last year, China’s ambassador Li Chao sent an official letter to the parliament complaining that Alender’s meeting with the Dalai Lama was an interference in China’s internal affairs.


Estonia does not stand alone in facing pressure about its politicians’ meetings. In 2015 Ojārs Ēriks Kalniņš, then the head of Latvia’s parliament’s foreign affairs committee, received a phone call from the Chinese ambassador to Latvia who was upset about the upcoming visit of Tibetan representatives. As a result, Kalniņš tried to persuade his fellow MPs not to meet the guests in the parliament building.


Kalniņš told Re:Baltica these were not threats but diplomacy, while acknowledging that he hadn’t received such calls from other ambassadors. Vita Matīsa, a trailblazer in the field of public diplomacy in Latvia, disputes this notion. “If it is said that you will be in trouble if you act a certain way, then I believe that is the definition of threats.”


 
 
 

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